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Abstract
Natural resources can create state-based and other conflicts through several causal mechanisms. 
Debate, however, has remained silent on forms of conflict, especially why violent or peaceful 
collective action occurs. Combining the literatures on nonviolent- and armed conflict with work 
on the resource–conflict link, we developed a number of hypotheses on how resources affect the 
conditions under which collective actors such as ethnic groups remain dormant, voice grievances 
peacefully or engage in violent rebellion. A grid-cell analysis of ethnic groups in Africa largely 
confirmed our expectation on the effect of resources. Resource deposits increased the risk that 
violent conflict would occur; the effect was reversed and ethnic groups become dormant when 
groups living in resource regions were politically included. We also found some evidence that 
lootable resources fuel violent but not peaceful conflict. However, the non-resource context best 
explained the difference between violent and nonviolent conflict. Democracy, political exclusion 
and geography such as distance from capital and transborder ethnic kin were key in explaining why 
violent and not peaceful protest emerged. Future research should dig deeper into mechanisms of 
how resources affect forms of conflict and should further study non-resource conditions that can 
have functionally equivalent effects.
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Introduction
Many studies show that natural resources can negatively affect producing states by increasing cor-
ruption, economic problems, and violent conflict (see e.g., Hunziker and Cederman, 2017; Le 
Billon, 2012; Ross, 2012;). However, with regards to conflict onset, empirical outcomes vary. In 
cases such as Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Nigeria, armed 
conflict over natural resources has claimed thousands of lives (Le Billon, 2012; Uppsala Conflict 
Data Programme (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, 2017). In 2012, protest against working condi-
tions at a platinum mine in Marikana, South Africa left dozens of miners dead (Alexander, 2013). 
At the same time, many protests in the mining sector remain peaceful throughout. For instance, 
local ethnic and other groups more often than not protested mining peacefully in Bolivia and Peru 
(Mähler and Pierskalla, 2014). In a third group of cases, largely under the radar of international 
media coverage, local groups suffered negative side-effects as a consequence of extraction without 
any visible mobilization. In these cases ‘dogs did not bark’ nor did they ‘bite’, but remained 
‘asleep’.1 How can we explain these differences? Why do (wo)men or, more specifically, ethnic 
groups rebel (Gurr, 1970, 2000), and by what means? Under what circumstances do ethnic groups 
take up arms against the state, when do they voice resource-related grievances in nonviolent man-
ners, and when do they remain dormant?
Recent years have seen an increase in studies addressing the different driving factors for vio-
lent and nonviolent protest (for instance Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013; Gleditsch and 
Rivera, 2015). However, the insights from this emerging field have yet to be translated to con-
flicts related to natural resource production. In this study, we made a first effort to integrate these 
two fields and develop an understanding of when groups in resource-endowed regions engage in 
dissident collective action violently, peacefully, or not at all. We proposed three main hypotheses 
using a motive–capacity-based framework. The hypotheses were tested in an analysis that 
employed a multinomial regression analysis of grid-cell data comprising resource location, eth-
nic groups’ inclusion into government and the economy, the lootability of resources, other eco-
nomic and geographic indicators as well as non- or low-level violent ‘social conflict’ and armed 
conflict events in Africa.
Results suggest that forms of dissident collective action or their absence indeed differ according 
to the influence of natural resources: resource deposits led to violent rather than peaceful protests 
in a given region, indicating a strong resource-related motive. The effect was reversed when ethnic 
groups that had settled in resource-endowed regions participated in the government, reducing the 
likelihood of all forms of protest. In addition, lootable resources tended to increase group capacity 
to engage in violent protest, although this result was less robust.
While resources thus partially explained why violent conflict occurs or not, contextual factors 
arguably better explained the differences between peaceful and violent protest. In particular, politi-
cal exclusion and geographical factors increased military capacities and explained why violent – 
and not peaceful – protest emerges; these factors explained the difference much better than 
resource-related variables. In sum, we conclude that political exclusion or inclusion is the best 
option to reduce resource-related conflict.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We first review the relevant literature on the 
topic. We then elaborate on our key concepts and develop a theoretical framework based on the 
assumption that collective actions require both motive and capacity. On this basis, we identify cor-
responding variables and draft a set of hypotheses. In the subsequent section, we outline our empir-
ical strategy to test these assumptions. Section five presents and discusses the results. The final 
section discusses the contribution of our findings and points to a number of challenges for future 
research.
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Literature review
Two strands of literature are important for our study. This section first summarizes the findings on 
the resource curse regarding conflict and then proceeds to discuss the state of the art on violent and 
nonviolent forms of conflict.
Forms of conflict in research on the resource–conflict link
Standard theories on causal mechanisms in the resource–conflict link (Hunziker and Cederman, 
2017; Koubi et al., 2013; Ross, 2004; Roy, 2016) agree that resources and conflict are mainly 
linked through motive and capacity.2 Dissident collective action can happen only when people are 
willing to (motive) and capable of (capacity) doing so. Motives for resource-related conflict can 
originate from undemocratic regimes (Ross, 2001), low rates of economic growth (Brunnschweiler, 
2008), a higher price of achieving control of government (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), lack of 
redistribution of resource revenues, or local grievances over negative externalities arising from 
extraction (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012). Capacities might arise at the local level from looting 
resources and blackmail surrounding production and transport (Lujala, 2010; Onuoha, 2008) as 
well as weakening state institutions as a result of national economies’ high dependence on resource 
production (Basedau and Lay, 2009).
Natural resource production thus impacts political stability through a variety of causal pathways 
at local and national levels. Regions that produce valuable natural resources are likely to experi-
ence a higher risk of instability due to grievances relating to environmental destruction, poor work-
ing conditions, or insufficient compensation to local communities.
Some research suggests, though, that such local direct effects of resource extraction are medi-
ated by political inclusion of ethnic and other groups living in resource-producing areas (Asal 
et al., 2015; Basedau and Pierskalla, 2014; Hunziker and Cederman, 2017). Factors such as ethnic 
exclusion, ethnic fragmentation, or simply the location of distinct ethnic groups interact with the 
production of precious resources in ways that can increase (or decrease) the risk of organized vio-
lent conflict onset.3 In addition to such local destabilizing effects, natural resource production can 
have an impact on the entire population’s motive for insurgency through corruption, low economic 
growth, and low legitimacy of autocratic systems.
These aforementioned mechanisms explain why conflict related to resources emerges. 
Importantly, however, they widely neglect the question of what form it takes. Studies typically 
focus on armed conflict only, but the known mechanisms can result in either peaceful or violent 
forms of dissident collective action.
To the best of our knowledge, few studies have systematically engaged with different forms of 
collective action in the resource–conflict link. Regan and Norton (2005) incorporate an aggregate 
measure of easily extractable resources into their study of nonviolent and violent resistance, find-
ing some counterintuitive evidence that resources reduce the risk of civil war onset. However, their 
study suffers from a number of shortcomings that include the use of debatable data and concepts 
and an aggregation at country level unable to capture the local developments that are likely to 
shape spontaneous forms of political protest.
Another study by Steinberg (2015) presents a formal model that analyses interactions between 
local groups, corporate extractive actors, and governments that derives conclusions about the like-
lihood of protest, repression, and public goods provision. However, Steinberg does not provide 
insights regarding the form of protest, nor is her model tested empirically. Mähler and Pierskalla 
found a relationship between gas deposits and social conflict events in Bolivia that is conditional 
on the presence of indigenous groups in the region (Mähler and Pierskalla, 2014). Their findings 
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point to the (conditional) relevance of natural resources, but do not assess whether varying forms 
of conflict are driven by distinct configurations of covariates. More recently, Hunziker and 
Cederman (2017) found that resource reserves increase the likelihood of armed conflict, but only 
separatist conflict, not all forms of armed conflict. However, the authors do not address the ques-
tion of violent and nonviolent dissident collective action.
Violent and nonviolent forms of conflict
Theoretical and empirical contributions concerned with the onset of violent and nonviolent politi-
cal collective action have not engaged in dialogue with each other until recently. For the most part, 
scholars interested in violent protest, including armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre 
and Sambanis, 2006; Kalyvas, 2006), and those researching nonviolent collective protest (Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006; Sharp, 1973) have developed separate theoretical frameworks and empirical 
studies (but see Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). This separation has started to 
disappear with the recent publication of global and regional datasets systematically reporting on 
nonviolent collective action that enables researchers to rigorously compare drivers and effects of 
violent and nonviolent conflict (Salehyan et al., 2012; Brunnschweiler and Lujala, 2019; Chenoweth 
and Lewis, 2013).
With the growing integration of these two research strands a number of publications have dem-
onstrated that the drivers of organized violent and nonviolent conflict differ (Chenoweth and 
Lewis, 2013; Cunningham, 2013 Regan and Norton, 2005). According to Chenoweth and Ulfelder 
(2015), nonviolent resistance is generally more difficult to predict than more violent forms of dis-
sidence; nonviolent conflict might be driven more by leaders’ agency and determination to over-
come adverse circumstances than by structural factors – or this lack or predictability might indicate 
that models of nonviolent resistance need to be refined (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015).
As far as results are available, several clusters of variables have a diverging impact on violent 
or nonviolent collective action. Intra-group factors describe characteristics such as group size, 
degree of fragmentation and concentration, group location, and previous history of protest 
(Cunningham, 2013; Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015; Raleigh, 2014). For instance, group size and 
internal fragmentation increase the risk of armed conflict but not the likelihood of nonviolent pro-
tests, while a history of nonviolent protest increases the likelihood of peaceful campaigns. Inter-
group factors include the relations between groups and with the state such as interaction with 
competing groups, economic and political discrimination, and state-led repression; these factors 
also significantly influence the onset of nonviolent as well as violent campaigns (Cunningham, 
2013; Pierskalla, 2010; Raleigh, 2014; Regan and Norton, 2005). Political exclusion, for example, 
tends to increase the likelihood of observing both forms of collective protest, but studies are divided 
over the significance of the effect (Regan and Norton, 2005 vs. Cunningham, 2013). Government-
level factors such as form of political regime and respect for civil liberties, elections, or state 
capacity seem to additionally shape the choice of collective protest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 
2015; Cunningham, 2013). Democracy only seems to decrease the emergence of nonviolent con-
flict, but does not seem to have a significant effect on armed conflict. Lastly, contextual factors 
such as terrain, population density, or time trends have been shown to have an impact on the onset 
of forms of conflict (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). For instance, 
variables such as rough terrain, oil exports, and ethnic and religious fractionalization seem to only 
increase the likelihood of armed conflict onset but have no significant effect on nonviolent dissi-
dent collective action. Table A in the Appendix summarizes the recent quantitative literature. Most 
recently, Brunnschweiler and Lujala (2019) have studied the impact of ‘economic backwardness 
and social tension’ and also compared classical armed conflict with peaceful mass campaigns and 
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found important differences, especially that nonviolent mass movements are more likely to happen 
in richer countries.
Despite several important insights by these studies, a number of gaps persist. Various variables 
have not been tested simultaneously in one study (e.g., a high, disproportionate number of young 
people (age 15-24 usually). (youth bulge) and urbanization) or have yielded contradictory results 
(e.g., gross domestic product per capita (GDP p.c.)). Moreover, most of the empirical studies focus 
on specific forms of protest only, namely organized and sustained forms of protest. Thus, they 
investigate factors that influence the onset of armed conflict versus mass-based social movements 
and preclude any less organized or less sustained forms of collective political action, such as riots 
or one-time demonstrations and strikes. In theoretical terms, it might be useful to include the band-
width of political collective action from its virtual absence (sleep) to the spontaneous or organized 
form of voicing grievances in nonviolent ways (bark) and lastly violent collective action directed 
against the state in a spontaneous or organized form (bite). Most importantly, only two studies have 
tested the influence of natural resources on nonviolent protest, with no or diverging findings 
(Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Regan and Norton, 2005).
In sum, the literature on violent and nonviolent conflict increasingly offers insights into how the 
determinants of varying forms of collective action differ. These insights, however, neglect the role 
of natural resources on the form of protest; literature on the resource–conflict link, in turn, remains 
widely silent on the form of dissident collective action. Generally, there is a certain lack of theoriz-
ing on the different forms of collective action.
A framework to explain the form of dissent collective action
Generally, we believe that groups face three basic choices of collective action vis-à-vis the state. 
Corresponding to figures of speech,4 we call them ‘sleep’, ‘bark’ and ‘bite’.
Sleep implies a lack of mobilization of a given collective actor for a common cause, that is, 
practically non-action. Sleep, according to our understanding, does not necessarily exclude the 
uncoordinated expression of demands and grievances within formal institutions such as particular 
voting behaviour or unorganized activities of group members within political institutions (e.g., 
elections or membership in parliament), but it does exclude any form of mobilization outside of 
political institutions.
Bark requires collective action against a specific policy or the system as a whole to occur out-
side of regular institutions, but it does not include the use of physical violence. Bark may take 
different forms such as spontaneous and organized demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, declarations 
and open letters, press campaigns and the like. The defining feature of barking is the active and 
visible voicing of collective grievances and demands5 outside the regular political institutions in 
nonviolent ways.
Unlike bark, bite necessarily involves violent action, targeted at a specific government policy or 
the system as a whole. Bite includes various forms of physical violence such as riots, isolated 
attacks against the government as well as outright rebellion, that is, armed conflict.
Each of the three basic options outlined above is shaped by collective actors’ motivation and 
capacity to mobilize. The debate on natural resources and other potential determinants of armed con-
flict has seen a dispute whether it is motive rather than capacity – or the other way around – that 
explains violence (Cederman et al., 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). We believe this debate to be 
theoretically rather unproductive. Obstacles to dissident collective action are nontrivial and in order 
for collective action to occur, groups have to be both willing to engage in a particular behaviour and 
also able to do so (Bara, 2014; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). As Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue, a 
crime – and any (collective) action – can only be committed when motive and capacity are present.6
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Taking this reasoning into account, we believe that when no or little capacity exists, it is likely 
that sleep will emerge. We also assume that differences in motive, for example, the seriousness of 
grievances over the unfair distribution of resource revenues may shift an actor’s choice between 
bark or bite. We hypothesized that the particular capacity structure would explain the peaceful or 
violent form of collective action targeted at the government.
Consequently, we distinguished between political and military capacity. Political capacity 
includes those conditions that enable groups to engage in peaceful protest (bark). It may include a 
surrounding condition such as a democratic political system that does not suppress peaceful pro-
test, but also the general capacity of a given group to mobilize. Military capacity refers to specific 
circumstances enabling groups to engage in bark, that is, violent action such as the availability of 
weapons, rugged terrain or weak security apparatus (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Military action 
is also comparatively expensive. Access to financial resources, for instance through so called loota-
ble resources (Le Billon, 2001; Lujala, 2010), will provide such funding.
Hypotheses
Which resource-related and other factors provide motive and military or political capacity to groups in 
order to engage in a peaceful or violent form of collective action, or bring about its complete absence? 
Most importantly, we have to specify the role of resources therein, particularly the presence of resource 
deposits, the access of groups to resources, and the lootability of the resources in question.
Our first hypothesis refers to the effect of natural resource deposits, that is, without further 
specifying any characteristics or context of the resources such as access to them. As natural 
resources can provide both motive and opportunity (Koubi et al., 2013; Le Billon, 2001), the pres-
ence of such resources should make sleep very unlikely. Regarding the form or type of natural 
resources, however, we have little theoretical reason to believe that their sheer presence makes 
violent conflict more likely. On average, sleep is unlikely but we cannot assume that the presence 
of natural resources will make a difference regarding the use of violent or peaceful forms of pro-
test. We hence expect:
H1 (natural resources): The presence of natural resources increases the likelihood of conflict; 
however, natural resources as such do not make a difference regarding whether protest is peace-
ful or violent.
In any case, context and especially access to the benefits of resources matter. When people benefit 
from resources and hence have no reason to develop grievances, it is not only unlikely that protests 
will emerge but that sleep becomes more likely. Previous studies have shown that ethnicity and 
resources interact and it matters greatly whether ethnic or other groups have access to these 
resources, for example, by inclusion in the government (Basedau and Pierskalla, 2014; Hunziker 
and Cederman, 2017). The second hypotheses hence expects the effect of resources to be reversed 
when the deposits are in the settlement areas of ethnic (or other socially relevant) groups that are 
included in the government and are therefore very likely to benefit rather than suffer from ‘their 
own’ resources. Pertinent country cases include for instance Botswana or many ethnic groups in 
Gabon. Hypotheses 2 hence expects:
H2 (groups inclusion in resource areas): If natural resources are located in the settlement areas 
of relevant ethnic groups that are included in the government, sleep is likely to emerge and 
violent and peaceful forms of protest become less likely.
Basedau and Roy 79
Our hypotheses thus far specify the differences regarding no protest and all forms of protest or con-
flict. But what makes the difference regarding bark or bite? Resources can provide two alternative 
theoretical explanations. First, if resource-related grievances are stronger, it will become more likely 
that violence will occur. Angrier people are more likely to be violent people. However, the degree of 
grievance is difficult to measure with the available data only to a certain degree. Moreover, we face 
many endogeneity issues regarding the form of violence.
We therefore hypothesize a second mechanism that builds on the capacity to engage in violence. 
As theorized and demonstrated by several studies (Le Billon, 2001; Lujala, 2010; Roy, 2016), 
lootable resources are more likely to be related to violent conflict. Longstanding civil wars in 
Colombia, DRC, Myanmar and Sierra Leone have been driven by lootable resources such as nar-
cotics, diamonds, gold and other precious metals. In these and other cases, the resources have been 
easily accessible to would-be or actual rebels. As the use of violence, especially armed rebellion, 
is more demanding in organizational terms, we expect:
H3 (lootable resources): Lootable resources provide necessary financial capacity for armed 
rebellion and thus increase the likelihood of armed rebellion (bite) rather than peaceful protest 
(bark).
The effects of resources do not occur outside of context (Le Billon, 2012). Generally, we should 
consider non-resource variables that create motives for dissident collective action such as group 
exclusion irrespective of resources, or a violent reaction by the state to nonviolent protest. Political 
capacity for nonviolent collective action includes demographic factors like group size or access to 
urban populations as well as the repressiveness of the political system. Military capacity for violent 
collective action comprises geographical and material factors like rugged terrain, groups’ transbor-
der ethnic kin, as well as previous armed conflicts that specifically favoured military, armed action. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to theorize the contextual variables individually, however Table 
B in the Appendix provides an overview on how variables affect protest and its forms. In sum our 
last hypothesis expects:
H4 (non-resource context): Non-resource factors strongly influence whether violent or peaceful 
protest occurs. Specifically, factors such as a repressive political system, economic and political 
exclusion as well as demographic and geographical variables that increase military capacity 
explain why groups bite and not just bark.
Analysis
Our framework investigates how resources shape the role of motive- and capacity-related factors 
in fostering different forms of dissident collective action. We adapted a spatially disaggregated 
analysis of grid-cell years in Africa from 1990–2013 in order to test whether nonviolent and vio-
lent events can be linked to grid-cell level motives and capacities for dissident collective action 
through resources. Such a spatial approach allowed us to investigate fine-grained outbursts of 
violent and nonviolent collective action and link these outcomes with local motives and capacities 
such as local levels of development, local groups’ status, or terrain characteristics and resource 
production.
Two alternative approaches to our question could have been taken: first, a country-level analysis 
could have traced motives and capacities for sleeping, barking or biting. Some variables like 
regime type operate at the national level and may thus be more appropriate for a country-level 
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analysis. However, our argument provides the basis for observable implications at a much more 
refined level that can be tested using data disaggregated at the local level. Natural resource produc-
tion clearly affects producing regions more directly than non-producing ones, making a spatial 
element in the resource–conflict link highly likely (Le Billon, 2001; Lujala, 2010; Urdal, 2008). 
Beyond natural resources, varying development levels, the location of politically relevant discrimi-
nated groups, or terrain are only among the many factors that drive the spatial nature of conflict 
patterns (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Weidmann and Ward, 2010). We 
expected the same for nonviolent forms of conflict: spatial disaggregation allowed us to analyse 
these patterns at the appropriate level
Second, a group-level analysis could have attempted to link groups’ grievances and capacities, 
resource-related or otherwise, to their choice of sleeping, barking or biting. Such an analysis would 
enable a more direct analysis than a grid-cell analysis that only approximates groups’ incentives 
and motives; however, it also threatens grave biases against ‘sleeping dogs’. Due to a well-docu-
mented reporting bias in favour of more sensational forms of collective action, existing data sets 
on ethnic groups are biased against groups that remain dormant, as they tend to identify active 
groups only. As a consequence, a group-based analysis could seriously underestimate the number 
of sleeping dogs (see Birnir et al., 2015 for promising ongoing data collection). Therefore, we 
preferred the grid-cell format that promised less bias given the current data availability.
Variables
Our dependent variable was a categorical indicator that consisted of sleep, bark or bite in a given 
grid-cell in a given year. Following the aforementioned conceptual considerations, we measured 
sleeping as the absence of any visible collective dissident action against the state outside conventional 
politics. Bark was measured as the onset of spontaneous or organized forms of nonviolent collective 
action as reported by the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD; see Salehyan et al., 2012).7 If a 
grid-cell experienced barking for more than 1 year in a row, we marked the dependent variable as 
missing unless a change to bite or sleep occurred. Bite was measured as the onset of violent confron-
tation between groups and the state as reported by SCAD and UCDP-Georeferenced Event 
Dataset(GED).8 Figure 1 shows a map with the spatial distribution of bark and bite events per grid 
cell for the entire time frame.
The choice of independent variables mirror the theoretical section above. Regarding our main 
independent variables on resources, we used DIADATA and PETRODATA (Lujala et al., 2005; 
Lujala et al., 2007) on diamonds, and oil and gas deposits as a source of resource-related variables. 
Hence, for testing H1, the variable resources was coded 1 (or otherwise 0), when the grid cell con-
tained diamonds, oil, or gas deposits. Offshore deposits were not included as we focused our analy-
sis on local outcomes, not country-level effects. Previous research found no significant effect of 
offshore oil rents on violent conflict onset (Lujala, 2010).
Most of the other independent variables, including controls, were taken from PRIO-GRID 2.0 
(Tollefsen et al., 2012) and GeoEPR 2.0 (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). Political exclusion was – 
combined with resources – a key variable for H2, where we expected a reverse effect of resources 
when groups living in respective areas are included in government and hence should benefit from 
them. We therefore interacted the presence of resources with the share of groups discriminated (or 
not) in a given cell. Because certain forms of dissident collective action have a low mobilization 
threshold (for instance spontaneous riots or protests), we decided against focusing simply on the 
political status of the largest group. Rather, we looked at the proportion of discriminated groups to 
get a measure of potential destabilization present in a given area. Nevertheless, most cells were 
home to only one ethnic group, making the variable essentially binary. In most of our models we 
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used groups with the status ‘monopoly’ in the central government as the operationalization of the 
interaction with resources.
Regarding H3 on the difference between peaceful and violent protest, we used a measure for 
lootable resources. We defined as lootable resources (lootable)  as secondary or alluvial diamonds, 
taken from DIADATA, which we coded according to the procedure used for resource deposits.
For H4, we looked at a number of non-resource ‘control’ variables that we expected to affect the 
relationship independent of resources. As outlined in the theoretical section, there were a number of 
mechanisms. Given space constraints, we have not engaged in detailed discussions. Table B in the 
Appendix summarizes our expectations regarding the four hypotheses on sleeping, barking or biting 
and the individual indicators and data sources separated into motives, and political and military 
capacity.
Measuring political discrimination can incur bias in the analysis, as discriminated groups are 
more likely to be reported when they are vocal about their discrimination, and this correlates with 
the outcome variable. Group-based differences in income may thus be a more reliable indicator of 
group status as it is not subject to such reporting bias. We used a grid-cell-based indicator that 
captured the cell’s deviation from the country’s GDP. Nevertheless, we caution against equating 
political- with economic status.
PRIO-GRID served as the basis for the grid-cell structure of our analysis and contained grids of 
0.5 × 0.5 decimal degrees, which translates to a cell of roughly 55 × 55 km at the equator (for 
more details see Tollefsen et al., 2012). Due to the regionally limited character of SCAD data, we 
restricted our analysis to the African continent from 1990–2013.
Figure 1. Spatial distribution, bark and bite events, 1990–2013.
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Empirically, we dealt with two limitations regarding the grouping of several control variables 
into motive and political or military capacity (see Table B in the Appendix). First, both motive as 
well as political and military capacity can be facilitated at the same time by various conditions. For 
instance, capacity for violent collective action may derive from transnational ethnic kin but also 
from a weak security apparatus or rough terrain.9 Lastly, as we present correlations, we caution 
against drawing overly ambitious causal inference from our results.
Model specification
To evaluate our hypotheses, we used multinomial logit for grid-cell years with spatio-temporal 
lags. Multinomial logit is the appropriate estimator because of the categorical character of our 
independent variable, which can take three values – sleep, bark and bite – and thus is neither binary 
nor continuous (for which logit or ordinary least squares would have been the estimator of choice). 
The reference category here was sleep, and the results report the likelihood of bark and bite relative 
to that reference category.
Spatial lags were included due to the observation that events tend to cluster in space, thus neces-
sitating the construction of a weighted measure of ongoing dissident collective action in neigh-
bouring units (Weidmann and Ward, 2010). We included a spatial lag based on the four surrounding 
grid-cells lagged by 1 year to account for such spatial dependencies. Further models included an 
alternative spatial lag based on the eight nearest neighbours.
Results
Table 1 reports the results of multinomial logit regressions. Model 1 shows our basic model with 
direct effects only at the cell level testing H1. Model 2 adds the country-level variables (political 
regime, male youth bulge, and military personnel). Model 3 introduces the effect of resource pro-
duction conditional on political power access to investigate H2, and Model 4 focusses on the effect 
of lootable resources on dissident collective action in order to test H3. All regressions include a 
spatial lag and a cubic polynomial for peace years (Carter and Signorino, 2010). The coefficients 
describe the risk of any given cell experiencing the onset of dissident collective action relative to 
its absence (sleep).
As revealed by all models, natural resources helped groups overcome barriers to violent collec-
tive action. Resource production in a given region increased the likelihood of violent rebellion, 
arguably due to grievances relating to environmental and working rights, insufficient compensa-
tion and participation of local groups in the revenue generated. However, contrary to expectations 
by H1, nonviolent protest was not consistently equally affected by resource production. Resources 
were only robustly linked to bite (and in the models including interaction terms). Theoretically, we 
may assume that resources provide, on average, stronger motive and thus are more likely to be 
associated with violence than peaceful dissidence.
When taking into account groups’ access to political power we see that natural resources with-
out groups’ monopoly access to national political power increase the likelihood of barking and 
biting, but where monopoly groups have access to natural resources, we are much more likely to 
see sleeping dogs (cf. Model 3). This finding confirmed our expectations formulated in H2. Figure 
2 illustrates the interactive relationships for both bark and bite. In line with Basedau and Pierskallas’ 
(2014) argument we expected this finding to be due to cooptation effects, largely operating on a 
mechanism of (lack of) motive.
Supporting H3 on the role of lootable natural resources in enabling violent collective action, 
Model 4 provided evidence in favour of the notion that military capacity arises from the 
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availability of easily looted precious natural resources. However, the significance of the effect was 
sensitive to dropping the military personnel or economic deprivation variables from the model (not 
reported) and we thus caution against drawing overly confident conclusions. Lootable resources 
have been connected with conflict duration rather than its onset (Lujala, 2010). The effect could 
become more robust when investigating conflict incidence or duration rather than onset.
Many interesting findings emerged from the control variables when testing H4. Taking account 
the slightly shaky findings for lootable resources, context arguably better explains differences 
between bark and bite, providing ample but somehow unspecified support for H4 (see also expecta-
tion in Table B in the Appendix). Other motive-related variables had an impact on dissident collec-
tive action onset in more straightforward ways. Political discrimination was key in explaining why 
violent and not peaceful protest emerged. The political discrimination of groups increased the 
likelihood of seeing biting dogs rather than sleeping ones, but had no effect on peaceful protest. 
The lack of political access may make political protest a less promising avenue for affected 
groups.10 However, contrary to expectations, a history of lethal government reaction to peaceful 
protest did not produce the expected shift from peaceful to violent protest in reaction to violent 
state reactions; rather we saw a strong effect for more peaceful protest and for violent forms of 
collective action.11
Key for the difference between violent and peaceful protest was, according to H4, military 
capacity. And indeed related variables affected the likelihood of violent forms of dissident collec-
tive action relative to the occurrence of peaceful protest. In line with standard literature on armed 
conflict onset, we were more likely to see biting dogs in areas with rough terrain, removed from the 
capital, and by groups that had ethnic ties across international borders.12
Another important factor was the political system that indeed shaped groups’ capacity for enact-
ing protest. As expected, peaceful protest was more likely in democratic systems, while violent 
protest was more probable in autocratic systems. Therefore, we conclude that the openness of 
country-level political institutions does indeed matter: democratic institutions increase groups’ 
capacity for nonviolent action and purvey the possibility of change through protest. Autocratic 
institutions, on the other hand, push groups to use more violent means to challenge the status quo. 
This result also matches the finding that political exclusion is related to violent collective action.
Moving on to factors shaping political capacities, larger groups were more likely to sleep than 
bite. This finding may be rooted in the fact that larger groups tend to have more influence on politi-
cal decisions and thus are less likely to be discriminated against.13 Other demographic factors 
boosted political capacity for both forms of protest: urban and densely populated areas were more 
likely to see collective dissident action than rural and sparsely populated ones. This finding 
Figure 2. Interaction effects, resource deposits and ethnic monopoly (H2).
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mirrored the difficulty of overcoming barriers to collective action in less connected areas that also 
provide less profitable loci for both barking and biting.14 A male youth bulge reduced the likeli-
hood of sleeping dogs with an effect on both forms, but a somewhat stronger one for nonviolent 
forms of protest.
Robustness
We conducted a number of robustness checks to demonstrate the reliability of our results that are 
reported in the online Appendix (see tables C to G). First, we changed the spatial lag structure from 
a four- to an eight-neighbour lag to prevent a distortion due to the arbitrary choice of the contiguity 
matrix. Results confirmed those reported in Table 3 (see Table C).
Second, we chose a slightly less restrictive operationalization of groups’ political status of 
inclusion. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (see e.g., Cederman et al., 2011), we coded 
discriminated and powerless groups as excluded, and monopoly and senior partner groups as 
groups in political power. Results hardly changed based on this broader definition of inclusion and 
exclusion (see Table D in the Appendix). Resources were insignificant in models 1 and 2 but turned 
significant again for both forms of protest when including interaction terms.
Third, in order to prevent some unobserved factors at the country level driving our results, we 
included country fixed-effects in our model (see Table E in the Appendix). The findings on resource 
deposits and lootable resources largely held and showed the same patterns as with alternative 
measures for group status. Findings on economic inclusion, and violent state reactions to previous 
peaceful protest were also robust under this model. Others did less well.15 More detailed multi-
level models could explore these important interactions between cell- and country-level variables 
in the future.
We also tested whether the results changed when looking at organized forms of protest only, 
according to the codings of the SCAD data (see Table F in the Appendix). Theoretically, it might 
be expected that capacity would matter more in these models. However, tendencies remained 
largely intact. One difference was noteworthy though. Peaceful barking was only insignificantly 
reduced for the interaction term of resources and monopoly in government. Urban areas, as men-
tioned above, were no longer significantly connected to violence, just to peaceful protest.
Further, we checked whether there were regional differences within Africa. North Africa and 
sub-Saharan Africa are regularly treated as separate regions, and have taken different trajectories 
politically and economically. In fact, a separate model on sub-Saharan Africa showed differ-
ences, albeit there were no dramatic differences in the models and the main tendencies remained 
intact (see Table G in the Appendix). Most importantly, the role of natural resources was more 
conflictive in sub-Saharan Africa and increased both forms of dissent collective action as origi-
nally expected by H1 (that resources affect all forms of protest or conflict). Inclusion in the 
government only insignificantly reduced violence (but in that sense still reversed the finding on 
resources without the interaction); lootable resource deposits fuelled both forms of protest. A 
few non-resource variables showed partially different findings.16 The diverging results for other 
variables might be due to often weak state institutions within sub-Saharan Africa. When states 
are weak, any kind of protest, but particularly violent ones, is more feasible.
In addition, we tested interactions between resource variables and violent state reactions to prior 
peaceful protest in order to assess finer conditional relationships between motive-based variables 
(not reported). We also tested for conditional relationships between military personnel and political 
discrimination as well as resource location. These additional models did not yield any added 
insights. Table 2 and 3 summarizes our results. These tables list the direction of effects significant 
at least at the 5% level. Less robust findings appear in brackets to illustrate their tentative 
character.
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Economic deprivation + –
Violent state responses to peaceful protest – + +
Political capacity  
Group size –
Pol discrim * group size +
Urban areas – + +
Population density – + +
Male youth bulge – + +
Democracy + –
Military capacity  
Mountainous terrain +
Periphery (border distance) –  
Capital distance – +
Transborder ethnic kin – +
Absolute development (GDP p.c.)  
Military personnel p.c. – +
Source: Authors’ compilation; signs in parentheses indicate non-robust findings; bold variables show differences in the 
direction of effects between bark and bite.
Discussion
What can we conclude from our findings in relation to our theoretical expectations? By and large, 
our hypotheses were confirmed, as tables 2 and 3 illustrate. However, there are a number of note-
worthy modifications, especially regarding the effect of context, which best explains the difference 
between bark and bite.
Confirming H1, areas with resource deposits were unlikely hosts of sleeping dogs, however, 
unexpectedly, were not equally likely to host barking dogs. Only in sub-Saharan Africa did the 
effect materialize as anticipated. Supporting H2, resource-endowed regions could buy peace with a 
combination of access to political power and to natural riches that coopt potentially violent actors. 
Lootable resources, lending support for H3, tended to increase the likelihood of biting- but not 
barking dogs. However, the effect of lootable resources, as proposed by H3, was less robust and did 
not make ethnic groups bite rather than bark across all specifications.
However, we found plenty of support for H4 that assumed that non-resource-related variables 
affected the form of dissidence in several ways, especially regarding the difference between peace-
ful and violent protest. A small number of variables stood out in that regard (see Table 3): Military 
Table 2. Overview of results on effects of resources (H1–3).
Sleep Bark Bite
H1: Resource deposits increase all forms of conflict – (+) +
H2: Resources interacted with political inclusion reverses effects + – –
H3: Lootable resources increase violent but not peaceful conflict (+)
Source: Authors’ compilation; signs in parentheses indicate non-robust findings.
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capacity such as transborder ethnic kin, distance from the capital, mountainous terrain as well as 
more military personnel decreased peaceful and increased violent protest. Political (and less 
straightforward economic) exclusion made a difference regarding the use of violence. Democracy 
tended to increase peaceful protest while autocracy increased violent uprisings. Where institutions 
inhibited nonviolent change, violent uprisings became a more tenable option.
At least two variables showed somewhat unexpected results. Economic deprivation decreased 
the likelihood of violence but increased peaceful protest events; larger groups were also less likely 
to protest (unless they were discriminated against). Both findings pointed to the fact that capacity 
might be more demanding for violent mobilization. In sum, resources matter for conflict, depend-
ing mainly on the access to them; however, military capacity and political inclusion made a differ-
ence regarding violent or peaceful protest.
Conclusion
Theorizing in the resource–conflict link suggests a number of causal mechanisms affecting actors’ 
motives and capacity for conflict. The debate has remained quite silent however on what forms 
such conflicts will take, especially the difference between violent and peaceful conflict. A grid-cell 
analysis of Africa that centred on ethnic groups suggests that the logic of nonviolent and violent 
conflict differs substantially. Resources best explained the difference between biting and sleeping 
dogs: resource deposits increased the probability of violent protest. The effect was reversed for all 
forms of protest when groups in resource regions participated in the government. There was some 
evidence that the lootability of resources contributed to having biting rather than barking dogs. 
However, contextual factors best explained the distinction between bark and bite: democracy and 
economic differences made peaceful protest more likely but not violence; geographic factors such 
as capital distance and transborder ethnic kin increased the likelihood of military action.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is one of the first studies to sys-
tematically investigate the distinctive causal logic of several (non)forms of dissident collective 
action in the debate on the resource–conflict link, bringing together two research strands that have 
thus far operated largely independently from each other. We have demonstrated that the location of 
resources matters for the onset of dissident collective action in a number of ways.
Second, our paper has yielded results that are important far beyond the resource–conflict link. 
We have shown that a theoretical framework of motive and capacity might be well-suited to study-
ing various forms of dissident collective action and to revealing some distinct determinants. Our 
empirical results support convincing evidence that both ‘grievances’ and ‘opportunity’ matter 
(Cederman et al., 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Gurr, 1970, 2000; Regan and Norton, 2005). 
For instance, a range of demographic and geographic factors create political capacity for groups to 
mobilize and hence affect whether protest emerges in the first place. Violent state responses tend 
to perpetuate both forms of protest. Authoritarian state–society relations such as a lack of democ-
racy and political exclusion of distinct groups as well as certain geographic and material capacity 
factors increase the likelihood of violence. Economic exclusion of groups reduces violent protest; 
an effect that is reversed when interacting with violent state repression.
Third and finally, we identified a number of variables that could serve as a starting point for 
designing promising strategies to forecast and successfully manage resource-related and other con-
flicts and prevent them from escalating into large scale violence. Lethal responses to peaceful 
protest, for instance, are not only ethically questionable but also unsuccessful in managing conflict; 
inclusion in resource-endowed governments is a way of avoiding protest. On the other hand, a 
more latent repressive approach relying on an overbearing security apparatus could successfully 
prevent peaceful protest from challenging the government; however, such latent repression is 
apparently less effective at preventing more devastating forms of protest.
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The best form to avoid violent protest seems to implement policies characterized by political 
and, with less straightforward empirical support, economic inclusion. Political exclusion drives 
violence, as does repression of protests by economically marginalized groups. Resource extraction 
without providing groups with access to political decision-making similarly increases the risk of 
violent events. At the same time, democracy or at least a share of political influence, particularly in 
resource-endowed regions, might be a promising way to prevent bloodshed. It is perhaps no coin-
cidence that African countries with relatively inclusive democratic systems and governments that 
at least partially share the riches with their populations, like Botswana, Namibia and – perhaps less 
clear-cut, as the Marikana case suggests – South Africa, experience little or no violence in relation 
to resource extraction.
Simultaneously, we have to consider a number of caveats. Our study is a first step rather than a 
final answer. Many open questions remain and there is huge opportunity for future research. Our 
results have to be replicated for other regions, with data on resources other than oil, gas and dia-
monds. We have identified significant statistical correlations, and several robustness checks con-
firmed our findings, but we cannot claim to have achieved full causal identification. Regarding the 
forms of dissident collective action, we may test more fine-grained concepts beyond our three basic 
options, including terrorism, organized or individual, as a special form of dissident action. We also 
cannot rule out the possibility that dissident action occurs in spatial units other than where motives 
emerged. Although we identified motive-related variables as being key drivers of (violent) protest, 
our findings may be biased in favour of capacity-related variables.
In methodological terms, many options could be useful in future studies. We could engage in a 
pronounced group-based format that allows a more precise attribution of motives and capacities to 
particular groups, use a formal model to capture the dynamic bargaining process between state and 
citizens better than in the static model proposed here, or employ configurational methods that 
could test interactions of higher order, that is, more complex interactive relationships between 
motives and capacities that likely drive the choice of collective action. Carefully selected and 
implemented case studies might be very useful in tracing the processes and exploring mechanisms. 
Future research needs novel data on group characteristics and grievances, resource-related and 
otherwise. All this will require substantial effort, but will be rewarding from both an academic and 
practical perspective. Understanding the conditions under which conflicts emerge at all and why 
some of these conflicts turn violent is essential for the prevention of violence.
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Notes
 1. We would like to kindly assure readers that, by using this analogy, we do not intend any degrading of 
collective actors and/or the canis lupus familiaris.
 2. Many different terms are used in the literature. For instance, opportunity often is equated with capacity. 
Motive is often used interchangeably with ‘grievances’, though being a special form of motive. ‘Greed’ 
might be an alternative form of motive. However, in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) it is directly connected 
to opportunity. We use capacity as referring to all factors that drive the ability of groups to act, and 
motive to any condition that increases their willingness.
 3. Ethnicity is only one of many possible identifiers (religion, language, region etc.) that facilitate col-
lective action. We chose ethnicity over other group-based attributes because it is a major factor in the 
African context (Posner, 2004) and spatially disaggregated data collection efforts are not available for 
other identifiers (Birnir et al., 2015).
 4. See Note 1: we do not intend any degradation of such groups by using this analogy.
 5. We use the terms ‘grievances’ and ‘demands’ interchangeably in this article, although the former stresses 
the negative assessment and the latter the content.
 6. We could just argue what is more important. By simple logic, however, both motive and capacity matter, 
and which counts more is an empirical question.
 7. We included demonstrations and strikes.
 8. We included riots (SCAD) and violent confrontations between rebel and state forces (UCDP).
 9. We thus face the problems of multiple causes and equifinality, that is, different variables can indepen-
dently or jointly link to the same outcome. A further problem refers to the ambiguity of variables. Some 
may indicate both motive and capacity. For instance, low development can provide a motive for collec-
tive action against the state but also create recruiting capacity due to low opportunity costs.
10. Economic deprivation produces unexpected results. Groups that are economically disadvantaged are 
more inclined to engage in nonviolent forms of collective action, but are less likely to engage in violence 
compared with those who are relatively better off. Here, a capacity-based modernization argument may 
be plausible: below average levels of economic development prevent the formation of the networks nec-
essary for violent protest (see also Cederman et al., 2011; and Appendix, Table F).
11. Violent state reactions interact with exclusion: the protest-inducing effect of violent state reactions to 
peaceful dissident collective action is particularly strong if there is prevalent economic or political dis-
crimination (results are available upon request).
12. The military personnel variable is an exception. Countries with a higher ratio of military per population 
are less likely to see peaceful protest and experience more violent conflict. A strong security apparatus is 
thus able to deter peaceful public protest that relies on visibility and is thus potentially more vulnerable to 
a state crack-down, but it affects violent protest positively. This positive correlation may be due to either 
a provocation effect that arises from stationing repressive forces; or it may be an endogenous finding 
as the military is more likely to be strong in areas with a history of violent uprisings against the state or 
expectations of such by the government.
13. An interaction and figure in Table H in the Appendix illustrate this argument: while larger groups overall 
are less likely to engage in violent protest, larger groups that are excluded from political power are sig-
nificantly more involved in violent action.
14. Contrary to insurgency, which tends to occur in remote areas, our interest in violent mobilization more 
generally also includes spontaneous and organized riots that more likely occur in urban centres, thus ren-
dering the positive effects on biting reported. Supporting this argument, Table E in the Appendix presents 
data on organized forms of collective action only; no positive correlate for urban areas and biting dogs 
was found.
15. Findings on regime type show reduced significance, and change directions in one model, while transbor-
der ethnic kin and military personnel lost significance. Bear in mind that the inclusion of fixed effects 
removes between-country variability and leaves variability within countries over time. Findings on 
regime type, for instance, should be interpreted not as differences between ceteris paribus more or less 
democratic states, but as reflecting the destabilizing potential of democratizing processes within states 
(Hegre et al., 2001).
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16. Male youth bulge and democracy are significant drivers of peaceful protest only. Distance from the capi-
tal reduces nonviolent forms only, and military personnel has no effect on peaceful protest. Transborder 
ethnic kin is no longer a significant correlate of dissident action. The latter can be explained by the fact 
that cross-border settlements are the rule rather than the exception in all sub-Saharan countries.
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